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Abstract
Adversarial examples are carefully constructed modifications to an input that completely change the
output of a classifier but are imperceptible to humans. Despite these successful attacks for continuous data
(such as image and audio samples), generating adversarial examples for discrete structures such as text has
proven significantly more challenging. In this paper we formulate the attacks with discrete input on a set
function as an optimization task. We prove that this set function is submodular for some popular neural
network text classifiers under simplifying assumption. This finding guarantees a 1− 1/e approximation
factor for attacks that use the greedy algorithm. Meanwhile, we show how to use the gradient of the
attacked classifier to guide the greedy search. Empirical studies with our proposed optimization scheme
show significantly improved attack ability and efficiency, on three different text classification tasks over
various baselines. We also use a joint sentence and word paraphrasing technique to maintain the original
semantics and syntax of the text. This is validated by a human subject evaluation in subjective metrics
on the quality and semantic coherence of our generated adversarial text.
1 Introduction
Adversarial examples are carefully constructed modifications to an input that completely change the output of
a classifier but are imperceptible to humans. Spam filtering and the carefully-crafted emails designed to fool
these early classifiers are the first examples of adversarial machine learning going back to 2004 [1, 2]; see also
the comprehensive survey by Biggio et al. [3]. Szegedy et al. [4] discovered that deep neural network image
classifiers can be fooled with tiny pixel perturbations; exploration of this failure of robustness has received
significant attention recently, see e.g. [5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12]. Adversarial training [5, 13] seems to be
the state of the art in defense against adversarial attacks, but creating robust classifiers remains challenging,
especially for large image classifiers, see e.g. Athalye at al. [14].
Despite these successful attacks for continuous data (such as image and audio samples), generating
adversarial examples for discrete structures such as text and code has proven significantly more challenging
in two aspects:
One challenge is how to develop a fast yet (provably) effective attacking scheme. Gradient-based adversarial
attacks for continuous data no longer directly apply to discrete structures. Although some variants are
proposed when the model is differentiable to the embedding layer [15, 16, 17, 18], this line of methods achieve
efficiency but suffer from poor success rate.
∗Both authors contributed equally to this work
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Meanwhile, another natural idea is to find feasible replacement for individual features like words or characters.
However, since the space of possible combinations of substitutions grows exponentially with the length of
input data, finding the optimal combination of substitutions is intractable. Recent heuristic attacks on NLP
classifiers operate by greedy character-level or word-level replacements [17, 19, 20]. However, greedy methods
are usually slow, and it’s theoretically not understood when they achieve good performance.
The other issue is how to maintain the original functionality of the input. Specifically for text, it remains
challenging to preserve semantic and syntactic properties of the original input from the point of view of a
human. Existing methods either require to change too many features, or change the original meaning. For
instance, [19] alters up to 50% of words in each input document to achieve a 30% success rate. [18] attacks
the document by replacing with completely different words. [21] inserts irrelevant sentences to the original
text. Such changes can be easily detected by humans.
In this paper we argue that these limitations can be be resolved with the framework we propose. We
highlight our main contributions as follows:
We propose a general framework for discrete attacks. We apply our framework to designing adversarial
attacks for text classifiers but our techniques can be applied more broadly. For instance, the attacks include
but are not limited to malware detection, spam filtering, or even discrete attacks defined on continuous data,
e.g., segmentation of an image.
We formulate the attacks with discrete input on a set function as an optimization task. This problem,
however, is provably NP-hard even for convex classifiers. We unify existing gradient-based as well as greedy
methods using a general combinatorial optimization via further assumptions. We note that gradient methods
solve a relaxed problem in polynomial time; while greedy algorithm for creating attacks has a provable
1− 1/e approximation factor assuming the set function is submodular. We theoretically show that for two
natural classes of neural network text classifiers, the set functions defined by the attacks are submodular. We
specifically analyze two classes of classifiers: The first is word-level CNN without dropout or softmax layers.
The second is a recurrent neural network (RNN) with one-dimensional hidden units and arbitrary time steps.
Nevertheless, greedy methods can be very time consuming when the space of attacks is large. We show how
to use the gradient of the attacked classifier to guide the combinatorial search. Our proposed gradient-guided
greedy method is inspired by the greedy coordinate descent Gauss-Southwell rule from continuous optimization
theory. The key idea is that we use the magnitude of the gradient to decide which features to attack in a
greedy fashion.
We extensively validate the proposed attacks empirically. With the proposed optimization scheme, we
show significantly improved attack performance over most recent baselines. Meanwhile we propose a joint
sentence and word paraphrasing technique to simultaneously ensure retention of the semantics and syntax of
the text.
2 Related Work
Broadly speaking, adversarial examples refer to minimally modified natural examples that are spurious but
perceptually similar and that lead to inconsistent decision making between humans and machine learning
models. An example is automatically classifying an adversarial stop sign image (according to humans) as
a speed limit sign. For continuous data such as images or audio, generating adversarial examples is often
accomplished by crafting additive perturbations of natural examples, resulting in visually imperceptible or
inaudible noise that misleads a target machine learning model. These small yet effective perturbations are
difficult for humans to detect, but will cause an apparently well-trained machine learning model to misbehave;
in particular, neural networks have been shown to be susceptible to such attacks [4], giving rise to substantial
concern about safety-critical and security-centric machine learning applications.
For classifiers with discrete input structures, a simple approach for generating adversarial examples is to
replace each feature with similar alternatives. Such features for text classification tasks are usually individual
words or characters. Such attacks can be achieved using continuous word embeddings or with respect to some
designed score function; this approach has been applied to attack NLP classifiers [15, 16, 22, 23, 24, 25, 18,
19, 26, 27, 20] and sequence-to-sequence models [17, 28, 29, 30]. The work in [31] considers semantically
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Task: Sentiment Analysis. Classifier: LSTM. Original: 100% Positive. ADV label: 100% Negative.
I suppose I should write a review here since my little Noodle-oo is currently serving as their spokes dog in the photos. We both
love Scooby Do’s. They treat my little butt-faced dog like a prince and are receptive to correcting anything about the cut that I
perceive as being weird. Like that funny poofy pompadour. Mohawk it out, yo. Done. In like five seconds my little man was
looking fabulous and bad ass. Not something easily accomplished with a prancing pup that literally chases butterflies through
tall grasses. (He ended up looking like a little lamb as the cut grew out too. So adorable.) The shampoo they use here is also
amazing. Noodles usually smells like tacos (a combination of beef stank and corn chips) but after getting back from the Do’s, he
smelled like Christmas morning! Sugar and spice and everything nice instead of frogs and snails and puppy dog tails. He’s got
some gender identity issues to deal with. The pricing is also cheaper than some of the big name conglomerates out there The
price is cheaper than some of the big names below. I’m talking to you Petsmart! I’ve taken my other pup to Smelly Dog before,
but unless I need dog sitting play time after the cut, I’ll go with Scooby’s. They genuinely seem to like my little Noodle monster.
Task: Fake-News Detection. Classifier: LSTM. Original label: 100% Fake. ADV label: 77% Real
Man Guy punctuates high-speed chase with stop at In-N-Out Burger drive-thru Print [Ed. - Well, that’s Okay, that ’s a new
one.] A One man is in custody after leading police on a bizarre chase into the east Valley on Wednesday night. Phoenix police
began has begun following the suspect in Phoenix and the pursuit continued into the east Valley, but it took a bizarre turn
when the suspect stopped at an In-N-Out Burger restaurant’s drive-thru drive-through near Priest and Ray Roads in Chandler.
The suspect appeared to order food, but then drove away and got out of his pickup truck near Rock Wren Way and Ray Road.
He then ran into a backyard ran to the backyard and tried to get into a house through the back door get in the home.
Task: Spam Filtering. Classifier: WCNN. Original label: 100% None-spam. ADV label: 100% Spam
> > Hi All,
> > I’m new to R from a C and Octave/Matlab background. I am trying to > > construct I ’m trying to build some classes in
R to which I want to attach pieces of data.
> > First, is attr(obj, ’member name’) > > this? > > No, it isn’t. You seem to be trying to deduce new-style classes from
a > > representation used before R 2.4, (actually, still used) > > but in any case it would not be » sensible. Please consult
Contact John M. Chambers. Programming with Data. > > Springer, New York, 1998, and/or William N. Venables and Brian D.
Ripley. > > S Programming. Springer, New York, 2000, or for a shorter online resource: > > http://www.stat.auckland.ac.nz/S-
Workshop/Gentleman/Methods.pdf > > Unfortunately, all of those references are at least 4 years out of > date when it comes
to S4 methods. Is there any comprehensive > reference of the current implementation of the S4 OO system apart from > the
source code? Not that I know of, and it is it’s a moving target. (E.g. I asked recently about some anomalies in the S4 bit
introduced for 2.4.0 and what the intended semantics are.) I’ve said before that I believe we can only help solve some of the
efficiency issues with S4 if we have a technical manual. It is unfair to pick out S4 here, but the ’R Internals’ manual is an
attempt to document important implementation ing details (mainly by studying the code), and that has only got most of the
way through src/main/*.c.
Figure 1: Examples of generated adversarial examples. The color red denotes sentence-level paraphrasing, and blue
denotes word-level paraphrasing.
equivalent rules for debugging NLP models, but under the same input structure. This is a natural but
limited practice to only consider attacks within one input structure, namely word or characters, but no joint
attacks, nor the effect incurred from sentences. Unlike prior work, we conduct a joint sentence and word
paraphrasing technique. It considers sentence-level factors and allows more degrees of freedom in generating
text adversarial examples, by exploring the rich set of semantically similar paraphrased sentences.
Jia and Liang studied adversarial examples in reading comprehension systems by inserting additional
sentences [21], which is beyond the concept of this paper since the approach changes the original meanings.
Another related line of research, although not cast as adversarial examples, focuses on improving model
robustness against out-of-vocabulary terms [32] or obscured embedding space representations [33].
3 Preliminary
In this paper, we propose a general framework for generating adversarial examples with discrete input data.
A collection of such data and corresponding attacks are presented in Table 1.
To present our mathematical formulation, we start by introducing some notation.
Input Structure. Let the input x = [x1, x2, · · · , xn] ∈ Xn be a list of n features (might be padded).
For text environment, the feature space X can be the character, word, phrase, or sentence space. For the
problem of malware detection, x is a concatenation of code pieces.
3
input data task
document text classification
code malware detection
url address malicious website check
Table 1: Applications to the framework.
Figure 2: An illustration of the transformation indexing when
applying to a text sentence. In this example, the transformation
denoted as l modifies the original sentence to the new one shown
in the red boxes.
Remark 1. For concrete usage, we use w ∈ W to denote word space, and s ∈ S to denote sentences to
distinguish the differences.
Embedding V . The embedding layer is a key transition from discrete input data into continuous space,
which could then be fed into the classifier. For text domain, we typically use the bag-of-words embedding or
word-to-vector embedding.
For a bag-of-words embedding, V : Xn → RD represents a document as the statistics of word counts, i.e.,
the summation of each word’s one-hot representation. Meanwhile, word-to-vector embeddings characterize
different words as D-dimensional vectors, i.e., V (x) ∈ RD,∀x ∈ X . When there’s no ambiguity, we also use
V : Xn → Rn×D to denote the concatenation of word vectors of the input document as a list of words.
Transformation Indexing. Suppose each feature x ∈ X has (at most) k − 1 possible replacements,
denoted by x(i), i ∈ [k − 1](≡ {1, 2, · · · , k − 1}). For future use, we also define x(0) = x, ∀x ∈ X .
A valid transformation T is the combined replacement of each individual feature xi, i ∈ [n]. Therefore
we index T by a vector l ∈ {0, 1, · · · , k − 1}n, and li indicates the index of each replacement i. Namely,
Tl(x = [x1, x2, · · · , xn]) = [x(l1)1 , x(l2)2 , · · · , x(ln)n ]. An example with word replacement in the text classification
environment can be found in Figure 2.
Classifier output Cy. We consider a targeted attack, i.e., we want to maximize the output probability
C over a specific target label y.
In this paper, we use a regular lower-case symbol to denote a scalar or a single feature, and use a bold
lower-case symbol for a vector or a list of features.
3.1 Problem Setup
In most scenarios, we only allow transformations on at most m features, then the constraint is ‖l‖0 ≤ m.
Therefore we present the adversarial attack problem formally:
Problem 1. For some input data x ∈ Xn and target label y, we try to find a feasible transformation Tl∗ ,
where l∗ ∈ {0, 1, · · · k − 1}n is the index so that:
l∗ = arg max
‖l‖0≤m
Cy (V (Tl(x))) . (1)
Or similarly, we want to find the set of features to attack, i.e.,
S∗ = arg max
|S|≤m
f(S), (2)
where we defined the set function f : 2[n] → R, f(S) = maxsupp(l)⊂S Cy(V (Tl(x))).
The set function f(S) represents the classifier output for the target label y if we apply a set of transforma-
tions S. We are therefore searching over all possible sets of up to m replacements to maximize the probability
of the target label output of a classifier.
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Remark 2. In this paper, we focus on replacements via word and sentence paraphrasing for empirical
studies. However, our formulation is general enough to represent any set of discrete transformations.
Possible transformations include replacement with the nearest neighbor of the gradient direction [18] and word
vectors [19], or flipping characters within each word [17]. We will also conduct a thorough experimental
comparisons among different choices.
4 Theoretical Analysis
First, notice that the original problem is computationally intractable in general:
Proposition 1. For a general classifier Cy, the problem 1 is NP-hard. Specifically, even for some convex
Cy, the problem 1 can be polynomially reduced from subset sum and hence is NP-hard.
Details and all proofs referenced to in this paper can be found in the appendix.
4.1 Unifying Related Methodology via Further Assumptions
Fortunately, with further assumptions it becomes possible to solve problem 1, above, in polynomial time.
Some existing heuristics are proposed to generate adversarial examples for the text classification problem.
Though usually not specifically proposed in the relevant literature, we unify the underlying assumptions for
these heuristics to succeed in polynomial time in this section.
One possible assumption is that the original function Cy is smooth, which could afterwards be approximated
by its first-order Taylor expansion:
Cy(V (Tl(x))) = Cy(v) + 〈∇Cy(v), V (Tl(x))− v〉+O
(‖V (Tl(x))− v‖22)
where v = V (x). Therefore, Problem 1 can be relaxed as follows:
Problem 2. Given gradient ∇Cy(v), where v = V (x), maximize function Cy by its first-order Taylor
expansion:
l∗ = arg max
‖l‖0≤m
V (Tl(x))
>∇Cy(v). (3)
Problem 2 is similar to the Frank-Wolfe method [34] in continuous optimization and is easy to solve:
Proposition 2. Problem 2 can be solved in polynomial time for both bag-of-words and word to vector
embeddings. Specifically, f(S) = arg maxsupp(l)⊂S V (Tl(x))>∆Cy(v) can be written as
∑
i∈S wi for some w
irrelevant to S, where v = V (x).
Related methods like [18] are attempts to solve problem 2. They propose to conduct transformations
via replacement by synonyms chosen by (3). However, activations like ReLU break the smoothness of the
function, and first order Taylor expansion only cares about very local information, while embeddings for word
synonyms could be actually not that close to each other. Consequently, this unnatural assumption prevents
related gradient-based attacks to achieve good performance.
Besides smoothness, another more natural assumption is that f(S) in the original problem 1 is submodu-
lar [35, 36]. Submodular is a property that is defined for set functions, which characterizes the diminishing
returns of the function value change as the size of the input set increases.
Definition 1. [37] If Ω is a finite set, a submodular function is a set function f : 2Ω → R, where 2Ω
denotes the power set of Ω , which satisfies one of the following equivalent conditions.
1. For every X,Y ⊆ Ω with X ⊆ Y and every x ∈ Ω\Y we have that f(X∪{x})−f(X) ≥ f(Y ∪{x})−f(Y ).
2. For every S, T ⊆ Ω we have that f(S) + f(T ) ≥ f(S ∪ T ) + f(S ∩ T ).
3. For every X ⊆ Ω and x1, x2 ∈ Ω\X we have that f(X ∪{x1}) + f(X ∪{x2}) ≥ f(X ∪{x1, x2}) + f(X).
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Figure 3: Model architecture of simplified W-CNN for an example sentence.
With the design of f(S) in Problem 1 to be monotone non-decreasing and if we further assume f to
be submodular, our task becomes to maximize a monotone submodular function subject to a cardinality
constraint [38]. Therefore, greedy method guarantees a good approximation of the optimal value of Problem
1:
Claim 1. In problem 1, f is monotone non-decreasing. Furthermore, if the function f is submodular, greedy
methods achieve a (1− 1/e)-approximation of the optimal solution in polynomial time.
Both our work and the optimization scheme from [19] propose some variants of greedy methods with the
underlying submodular assumption.
The greedy method proposed in [19] selects candidate replacements directly by function value, one word
at a time, which we will refer as the objective-guided greedy method. We will propose a more efficient yet
comparable effective greedy method that is guided by the gradient magnitude in Section 5.2, and compare
with the above two methods in Section 6.3. As an extension from the continuous optimization, our method
uses the well-studied Gauss-Southwell rule [39] that is provably better than random selection. In each
iteration, we determine and select the most important words by the gradient norm of words’ embeddings, and
then find the greediest transformation within the search space of the selected words. The advantage is that
we are able to conduct multiple replacements in one iteration and thus take into consideration the joint effect
of multiple words replacements. We will introduce our method, which we call Gradient-Guided Greedy Word
Paraphrasing in Algorithm 3, and will show empirical performance comparison with the (objective-guided)
greedy method [19] and the gradient method used in [18] in Section 6.3.
4.2 Submodular Neural Networks on the Set of Attacks
To argue that submodular is a natural assumption, we study and summarize the neural networks are
submodular on the set of attacks.
In [40], it provides a class of submodular functions used in the deep learning community called deep
submodular functions. Nevertheless the deep submodular functions are not necessarily applicable to our set
function. We hereby formally prove the following two kinds of neural networks, that are ubiquitously used for
text classification, indeed satisfy submodular property on the set of attacks under some conditions.
4.2.1 Simplified W-CNN [41]
Denote the stride as s, the number of grams (window size) h, and the word vector of the i-th word in a
document as vi(≡ V (xi)). Then the output for the convolutional layer is a matrix C = [cij ]i∈[n/s],j∈[m] from
n words and m filters:
cij = φ(w
>
j vs(i−1)+1:s(i−1)+h + bj), i = 1, 2, · · ·n/s,
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where wj ∈ RDh is the j-th filter, bj is the corresponding bias term and φ is the non-linear, and non-decreasing
activation such as ReLU, tanh and sigmoid function. vi:j denotes the concatenation of word vectors in the
window of words i through j, namely [v>i ,v>i+1, · · ·v>j ]> ∈ RD(j−i+1). Each filter wj is applied to individual
windows of words to produce a feature map cj = [c1j , c2j , · · · cn/s,j ]>.
Afterwards, a max-over-time pooling is applied to each feature map to form the penultimate layer
cˆ = [cˆ1, cˆ2, · · · cˆm], where cˆi is the largest value in cj :
cˆj = max
i
cij .
Compared to the original [41] paper, we only omit the dropout and softmax layer, and instead consider
the following WCNN classifier output for a target label:
CWCNN(v1:n) = w
′ · cˆ+ b′ (4)
Theorem 1. We consider the simple version of W-CNN classifier described in (4), and suppose there’s no
overlapping between each window, i.e., s ≥ h, and w′ has all non-negative values. If further we only look at
transformations that will increase the output, i.e., w>j V (x
(t)
i ) ≥ w>j V (xi),∀i ∈ [n], j ∈ [m], t ∈ [k − 1], then
fWCNN(S) = maxsupp(l)∈S CWCNN(V (Tl(x))) is submodular.
The proof sketch is as follows. Every coordinate in cˆ is a combination of max pooling over a modular
function and is therefore submodular. And finally sums of submodular functions is still submodular.
Besides word-level CNN, another network that is popular in the NLP community is the recurrent neural
network (RNN) or its variants. We will show that under some conditions, RNN satisfies submodular property.
4.2.2 Recurrent Neural Network with One-dimensional Hidden Units
Consider a RNN with T time steps and each hidden layer is a single node. Then for all t ≤ T , given the
value of a previous hidden state ht−1 ∈ R and an input word vector vt−1 ∈ RD (vt ≡ V (xt)), RNN computes
the next hidden state ht and output vector ot ∈ R as:
ht = φ(wht−1 +m>vt−1 + b) (5)
The classifier output is CRNN(v1:T ) = yhT .
Theorem 2. For a recurrent neural network with T time steps and one-dimensional hidden nodes described
in (5), if w and y are positive, and the activation is a non-decreasing concave function, then fRNN(S) =
maxsupp(l)∈S CRNN(V (Tl(x))) is submodular.
This result is quite surprising, since the word vectors influence the network’s output on different time
steps and are by no means separable. In the proof, we first show that a same amount of change induced on
an intermediate layer has a diminishing effect when the network is attacked on more features. Then together
with the concavity and non-decreasing property of the network, we are able to finish the proof.
5 Adversarial Text Examples via Paraphrasing
In order to conduct adversarial attacks on models with discrete input data like text, one essential challenge is
how to select suitable candidate replacements so that the generated text is both semantic meaning preserving
and syntactically valid. Another key issue is how to develop an efficient yet effective optimization scheme
to find good transformations. To solve the above two issues, we propose our methodology for generating
adversarial examples for text.
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Algorithm 1 Joint Sentence And Word Paraphrasing(Cy,x(0), P, δ, λs, λw, δs, δw, τ, k)
1: Input: Classifier C associated with target label y, input document x(0), language model P trained on the
training set, syntactic threshold δ, sentence and word paraphrasing ratio λs, λw, termination threshold τ ,
WMD threshold δs, δw, limit number of paraphrases k.
2: Conduct sentence separation x(0) → [s1, s2, · · · sl], si ∈ S, 1 ≤ i ≤ l. (See Remark 1).
3: Create sentence neighboring set S = {S1, S2, · · ·Sl}, where each Si ⊂ S satisfies that |Si| ≤ k and
WMD(si, s) ≤ δs,∀s ∈ Si.
4: x(1) ← Greedy Sentence Paraphrasing(Cy,x(0),S, λs, τ) in Alg. 2.
5: If Cy(V (x)) ≥ τ Return x(1)
6: Conduct word separation x(1) → [w1, w2, · · ·wn], wi ∈ W, 1 ≤ i ≤ n.
7: Create word neighboring set W = {W1,W2, · · ·Wn}, where each Wi ⊂ W satisfies that |Wi| ≤ k and
WMD(wi, w) ≤ δw, |P (x(1))−P (x′(w))| ≤ δ, ∀w ∈Wi, where x′(w) is text x(1) in which wi is substituted
by w.
8: x(2) ← Gradient Guided Greedy Word Paraphrasing(Cy,x(1),W, λw, τ) in Alg. 3.
9: Return x(2)
Algorithm 2 Greedy Sentence Paraphrasing(Cy,x,S, λs, τ)
1: Input: Document x as list of sentences [s1, s2, · · · , sl], sentence neighboring sets S = {S1, S2 · · ·Sn},
model Cy and parameters λs, τ .
2: while Cy(V (x)) ≤ τ and number of sentence paraphrased ≤ λsl do
3: Create candidate set M = ∅
4: for j = 1, 2, · · · , l do
5: for s ∈ Sj do
6: Substitute sj by s to get x′ and add it to the candidate set M ←M ∪ {x′}.
7: end for
8: x← arg maxx′∈M Cy(V (x′))
9: end for
10: end while
5.1 Joint Sentence and Word Paraphrasing
To coincide with the definition of adversarial examples for text, we first determine appropriate word and
sentence paraphrasing methods that maintain the semantic meaning of the original text. Our scheme is to
generate an initial set for word and sentence replacements with a well-studied paraphrasing corpus and then
filter out discrepant choices based on their semantic and syntactic similarities to the original text. A similar
mechanism was also used by [19] to generate word replacement candidates.
Paraphrasing Corpus.
For word paraphrasing, we use the Paragram-SL999 [42] of 300 dimensional paragram embeddings to generate
neighboring paraphrasing for words. For sentences, we use the pretrained model from Wieting and Gimpel’s
Para-nmt-50m project [43] to generate sentence paraphrases.
We further specify semantic and syntactic constraints to ensure good quality in adversarial texts:
Semantic similarity.
We use the Word Mover Distance (WMD) [44] to measure semantic dissimilarity. For sentence pairs, WMD
captures the minimum total semantic distance that the embedded words of one sentence need to “travel” to
the embedded words of another sentence. While for words, WMD directly measures the distance between
their embeddings.
Syntactic similarity.
Alongside the semantic constraint, one should also ensure that the generated sentence is fluent and natural.
We make use of a language model as in [19], P : Xn → [0, 1] to calculate the probability of the adversarial
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Algorithm 3 Gradient Guided Greedy Word Paraphrasing(Cy,x,W, λw, τ)
1: Input: Document x as a list of words [w1, w2, · · · , wn], word neighboring sets W = {W1,W2 · · ·Wn},
model Cy and parameters λw, τ .
2: Let N (that we set as 5) be the number of words to replace at most in each iteration
3: while Cy(x) ≤ τ and number of words paraphrased ≤ λwn do
4: Compute score for each word p: pi = ‖∇iCy(v)‖2, where v = V (x) and ∇i denotes the gradient with
respect to the embedding of the i-th word in x.
5: Get the indices I = {i1, i2, · · · iN}: the N largest indices in p.
6: Create candidate set M = {x}
7: for j ∈ I do
8: Let the new candidate set M¯ ← ∅
9: for x¯ ∈M do
10: for w ∈Wj do
11: Substitute the j-th word in x¯ by w to get x′ and add it to the candidate set M¯ ← M¯ ∪ {x′}.
12: end for
13: end for
14: M ←M ∪ M¯
15: end for
16: x← arg maxx′∈M Cy(x′)
17: end while
sentence, and require:
| ln(P (x))− ln(P (x′))| ≤ δ,
where x′ is the adversarial sentence paraphrased from x.
In Algorithm 1, we present the whole procedure of finding the neighboring sets to conduct our proposal
joint sentence and word paraphrasing attack. While with more details, we show how to use the objective
value as well as gradient information to guide the search in Algorithm 2 (for sentences) and 3 (for words).
5.2 Gradient-Guided Greedy Method
In Section 3.1 we have demonstrated the difficulty of finding the best transformation from combinatorially
many choices. Here we specify our proposal, gradient-guided greedy word paraphrasing, as shown in Algorithm
3. We can see that we first use gradient values to determine the index set of N words (wi1 , wi2 , · · ·wiN ) that
we want to replace (steps 4-5). Then in steps 7-15 we create a candidate set of all possible transformations in
Wi1 × · · · ×WiN . Finally, we choose the best paraphrase combinations within the candidate set. In this way,
we are able to conduct multiple replacements in one iteration and thus take into consideration the joint effect
of multiple words replacements.
This method is based on an intuition derived from coordinate descent with the Gauss-Southwell rule [39] in
the continuous optimization theory; normally, updating the coordinates with the highest absolute gradient
values is provably faster than optimizing over random coordinates [45, 46]. We only conduct this method
in word paraphrasing, since the gradient information of sentence embedding is less trustworthy. Usually
sentence paraphrasing changes the number of words. The calculated gradient before paraphrasing step might
not even correspond to the right position of the new sentence. Therefore it makes more sense to use the
objective value only and goes back to our Algorithm 2.
6 Experiments
In this section, we provide empirical evidence of the advantages of our attack scheme via joint sentence and
word paraphrasing on both two WCNN and LSTM models and various classification tasks. Our code for
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replicating our experiments is available online1.
6.1 Tasks and Models.
We focus on attacking the following state-of-the-art models which also echo our theoretical analysis:
• Word-level Convolutional Network (WCNN).
We implement a convolutional neural network [41] with a temporal convolutional layer of kernel size 3
and a max-pooling layer, followed by a fully connected layer for the classification output.
• Long Short Term Memory classifier (LSTM).
The LSTM Classifier [47] is well-suited to classifying text sequences of various lengths. We construct a
one-layer LSTM with 512 hidden nodes, following the architecture used in [19, 48].
We carried out experiments on three different text classification tasks: fake-news detection, spam filtering
and sentiment analysis; these tasks are also considered in [19]. The corresponding datasets include:
• Fake/Real News.
The fake news repository [49] contains 6336 clean articles of both fake and real news in a 1:1 ratio
(5336 training and 1000 testing), with both left- and right-wing sites as sources.
• Trec07p (emails).
The TREC 2007 Public Spam Corpus (Trec07p) contains 75,419 messages of ham (non-spam) and spam
in a 1:2 ratio. We preprocess the data and retain only the main content in each email. We randomly
hold out 10% as testing data.
• Yelp reviews.
The Yelp reviews dataset was obtained from the Yelp Dataset Challenge in 2015. The polarity dataset
we used was constructed for a binary classification task that labels 1 star as negative and 5 star as
positive. The dataset contains 560,000 training and 38,000 testing documents.
6.2 General Settings
For the training procedure, we use similar settings for the WCNN and LSTM classifier. We extracted the
top 100,000 most frequent words to form the vocabulary. The first layer of both WCNN and LSTM is the
embedding that transforms individual word into a 300-dimensional vector using the pretrained word2vec
embeddings [50]. We randomly hold out 10% training data as validation set to choose the number of epochs
and use a constant mini-batch size of 16.
We manually selected the hyperparameters for each dataset. We set the termination threshold τ = 0.7,
and set a neighbor size k for possible paraphrases to be 15. We set the semantic similarity δw = δs = 0.752
for all datasets and syntactic bound δ2 = 2 for news and yelp datasets, and δ =∞ for Trec07p; the email
dataset contains many corrupted words rendering the language model ineffective. For all datasets, we only
allow λw = 20% word paraphrasing. We set the sentence paraphrasing ratio λs = 20% for yelp and news
dataset, and for spam λs = 60%.
6.3 Accuracy comparisons.
After setting up the experimental environment, we now present the empirical studies in several aspects. In
Table 2 we present the original and adversarial test accuracy on the three datasets with the two chosen
models, where we allow 20% word replacements. We also include the presented adversarial accuracy from
[19] for reference. Since the word neighboring sets for the two methods are different and the values are not
1https://github.com/cecilialeiqi/adversarial_text
2We use the WMD similarity in python’s spacy package. The similarity is in [0,1] basis where 1 means identical and 0 means
complete irrelevant.
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Dataset WCNN LSTM
Origin ADV (ours) ADV [19] Origin ADV (ours) ADV [19]
News 93.1% 35.4% 71.0% 70.5%* 93.3% 16.5% 37.0% 22.8%*
Trec07p 99.1% 48.6% 64.5% 63.5%* 99.7% 31.1% 39.8% 37.6%*
Yelp 93.6% 23.1% 39.0% 41.2%* 96.4% 30.0% 24.0% 29.2%*
Table 2: Classifier accuracy on each dataset. Origin and ADV respectively stand for the clean and adversarial testing
results. For all datasets, we set word paraphrasing ratio to be λw = 20% for our method (ADV(ours)). We include
results from [19] for comparison. The first column indicates reported values in their paper; while the consequent
column marked by asterisk is our implementation using greedy method in [19] and the same word neighboring set as
our method. Both results use large λw = 50% and allow many more word replacements.
News Trec07p Yelp
Figure 4: Success rate of attacking the LSTM classifier with different ratios of allowed paraphrasing.
directly comparable, one might argue that we have broaden the search space of words to make the problem
easier. Therefore we also implemented the greedy mechanism in [19] using the same word replacement set as
our method has chosen (marked by ∗). Both the reported values from [19] and our implementation allow
50% word replacements. From Table 2 we can see that in both settings, we are able to successfully flip
more prediction classes with fewer word paraphrases. We hereby conclude that joint sentence and word level
paraphrasing is much more effective than mere word replacements. Meanwhile, since sentence-level attacks
almost perfectly preserve the original meaning, our method can be less susceptible to humans. In the appendix
we use some concrete examples to show the significantly improved quality of our generated adversarial texts
compared to [19, 18].3 In the examples, we can see that sometimes by simplifying or changing the language,
or even by making the slightest changes like adding or erasing space, the sentence paraphrase can make a
tremendous difference to the classifier output. Consequently, our method does far fewer word level alterations
than other methods and greatly reduces the possibility of syntactic or grammar errors.
To further investigate the joint effect from combining sentence and word level attacks, we also study how
each model is susceptible to different degrees of change permitted for both attack levels. Therefore we tested
and presented the joint influence in Figure 4 for ratios of sentence paraphrasing λs ranging from 0% to 60%,
as well as for allowed word paraphrasing percentages λw: 0%, 10%, 20% and 30%. In all datasets, sentence
paraphrasing is especially effective when we allow only a few word paraphrases. For instance, in the sentiment
analysis task, we could only successfully attack around 5% reviews by paraphrasing 10% of words. But after
conducting 60% sentence paraphrasing beforehand, the success rate increases to almost 60%.
3Since the former code is not available online, we implemented their algorithms. We use their chosen parameters to generate
the adversarial examples to compare the quality of sentences in the appendix. While in Section 5.2 we use the same word
neighboring sets for all algorithms to make a fair comparison of the optimization schemes.
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Method objective-guided greedy [19] gradient method [18] ours (Alg. 3)
λw = 5% λw = 20% λw = 5% λw = 20% λw = 5% λw = 20%
News SR: 26.2% 28.4% 9.93% 12.8% 39.7% 45.4%time: 0.79 1.46 0.13 0.21 0.26 0.31
Trec07p SR: 5.1% 24.9% 0.86% 3.4% 12.9 % 45.3 %time: 0.19 0.33 0.03 0.05 0.07 0.09
Yelp SR: 12.7% 45.0% 4.2% 9.1% 20.7% 55.9%time: 0.15 0.21 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.05
Table 3: Attack success rate (denoted by SR) and time comparisons of each optimization mechanism. The performance
is reported on the WCNN classifier. Here objective-guided greedy indicates the greedy method used in [19], and the
gradient method is the one suggested in [18]. We can see that even when only applying Algorithm 3, our optimization
method is more effective among others.
6.4 Optimization Method Comparisons for Word-level Attacks.
To investigate the effectiveness of our proposed gradient-guided greedy method, we implement and compare
the time consumption and success rate with Algorithm 3 and the other two techniques: the gradient method
[18] and the objective-guided greedy method [19]. To make a fair comparisons of the optimization schemes,
we do not conduct sentence level paraphrasing in any of the methods, and we use the same hyperparameters
and settings as suggested in Section 6.1. We observe that our scheme is especially more appealing to WCNN,
partially because we used 5% dropout for inference. Recent work [51] indicates dropout not only works for
training but also for inference as a Bayesian approximation. The small alteration of one word replacement per
iteration [19] is not significant enough to be considered as true gains or the noise from the dropout. While
our method replaces 5 words per iteration to capture more difference, thus it is easier to distinguish the
change from the dropout randomness. From Table 3 we can see that our method requires only 1/5 to 1/3
time cost relative to the objective-guided greedy method and also achieves better success rate. On the other
hand, gradient method fails to produce good performance when we allow a small set of word replacements.
Dataset Task I Task II
News Trec07p Yelp News Trec07p Yelp
Original 70.0% 80.0% 100.0% 3.06 ± 0.67 3.23 ± 0.31 1.93 ± 0.55
Adversarial 50.0% 80.0% 100.0% 3.13 ± 0.50 3.10 ± 0.40 2.10 ± 1.05
Table 4: Human-subject validation. Task I measures classification accuracy while Task II the subjective likelihood
that each example was crafted by a human (scale from 1 to 5). We used five participants, each shown n = 60 text
examples, half original and half generated using our algorithm. The quality of the generated adversarial text (Task
II) is near equal to the original and in fact, slightly higher for the Yelp dataset, but this finding is not necessarily
statistically significant.
6.5 Human Evaluation Validation
Despite the significantly higher attack proportion of our text examples, our aim is to deliver a message that is
faithful to and coherent with the original text. To evaluate the quality of these generated text examples, we
presented a number of original and adversarial text pairs (randomly shuffled before the test) to five human
evaluators. The evaluators were asked to complete two tasks: I) Assign the correct label to each text sample;
II) Rate each text sample with respect the the likelihood that was crafted by a human (scale from 1 to 5).
We adopted a majority vote for task I, and averaged the results from five evaluators for task II. As shown in
Table 4, we found that human evaluators tend to achieve similar performance for each kind of text in both
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tasks, indicating that text examples generated via joint sentence and word paraphrasing are indeed coherent
and faithful to the original texts in the relevant respects.
Dataset LSTM WCNN
News Trec07p Yelp News Trec07p Yelp
Test (before) 93.3% 99.7% 96.4% 93.1% 99.1% 93.6%
Test (after) 94.5% 99.5% 97.3% 93.8% 99.2% 94.9%
ADV (before) 16.5% 31.1% 30.0% 35.4% 48.6% 23.1%
ADV (after) 32.7% 50.1% 46.7% 40.0% 54.2% 44.4%
Table 5: Performance of adversarial training.
6.6 Adversarial Training.
Finally, we investigated whether our adversarial examples can help improve model robustness. For each
dataset, we randomly selected 20% of the training data and generated adversarial examples from them using
Algorithm 1. We then merged these adversarial examples with corrected labels into the training set and
retrained the model. We present the testing and adversarial accuracy before and after this adversarial training
process in Table 5. Under almost all circumstances, adversarial training improved the generalization of the
model and made it less susceptible to attack.
7 Conclusion
In this paper, we propose a general framework for discrete adversarial attacks. Mathematically, we formulate
the adversarial attack as an optimization task on a set of attacks. We then theoretically prove that greedy
method guarantees a 1− 1/e approximation factor for two classes of neural network for text classification
task. Empirically, we propose a gradient-guided greedy method that inherits the efficiency of gradient method
and ability to attack of greedy method. Specifically, we investigate joint sentence and word paraphrasing to
generate attacking space that maintain the original semantics and syntax for text adversarial examples.
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A Proofs
A.1 Proof of Proposition 1
Proof of Proposition 1. We will show that even for a very simple function f , it could be reduced from subset
sum problem when k ≥ 2.
For instance, let
f(S) = arg max
supp(l)⊂S
∥∥∥∥∥
n∑
i=1
V (x
(li)
i )− v
∥∥∥∥∥
2
2
,
where the target is to find the best `2 approximation of some target vector v from the embedding vectors.
For simplicity, denote the embedding vector of each paraphrased words to be V (x(j)i ) = v
(j)
i , 1 ≤ i ≤
n, 0 ≤ j ≤ k− 1. Suppose there is an algorithm that solves the above problem in time polynomial to n. Then
we will now show that the subset sum problem has a solution in polynomial time. Let the n numbers to be
s1, s2, · · · sn, and the target to be W . Then we let v(0)i = [si, 0, 0, · · · , 0], and v(j)i = 0, j = 1, · · · k − 1, with
target v = [W, 0, 0, · · · , 0]. Then just check if the best approximation of v is exactly v will suffice the subset
sum problem. Therefore it contradicts with the fact that subset sum is in NP-complete class.
A.2 Proof of Proposition 2
Proof of Proposition 2. Define set function h(S) = arg maxsupp(l)⊂S V (Tl(x))>∇Cy(v), where v = V (x).
Denote g = ∇Cy(v). When V is bag-of-words embedding, we denote the embedding of each paraphrased
word in x = [x1, x2, · · · , xn] as V (x(j)i ) = edij . Here for any i, ei is defined as the one-hot vector with 1 in
index i and 0 elsewhere. Then V (Tl(x)) =
∑n
i=1 edili .
h(S) = arg max
supp(l)⊂S
V (Tl(x))
>g
= arg max
supp(l)⊂S
n∑
i=1
e>dilig
= arg max
supp(l)⊂S
n∑
i=1
gdili
= 1>Sw,
where wi = max0≤t≤k−1 gdit .
When V is d-dimentional word2vec embedding, the embedding V (x) = [V (x1)>|V (x2)>| · · · |V (xn)>]> ∈
Rnd. Denote gˆi = g(id−d+1):id to be the gradient with respect to the word wi.
h(S) = arg max
supp(l)⊂S
V (Tl(x))
>g
= arg max
supp(l)⊂S
n∑
i=1
V (x
(li)
i )
>gˆi
= 1>Sw,
where wi = max0≤t≤k−1 V (x
(t)
i )
>gˆi. Therefore for both bag-of-words embedding and word2vec embedding, h
is a modular (linear) set function, and Problem 2 is solvable in polynomial time.
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A.3 Proof of Claim 1
Proof of Claim 1. Clearly for any S ⊂ V ⊂ [n],
f(S) = max
supp(l)⊂S
Cy(V (Tl(x))) ≤ max
supp(l)⊂V
Cy(V (Tl(x))) (since S ⊂ T )
= f(V )
Therefore the set function f is non-decreasing. Since the problem of maximizing a monotone submodular
function subject to a cardinality constraint admits a 1− 1/e approximation algorithm[38], Problem 1 can be
solved in time polynomial to n with greedy method.
A.4 Proof of Theorem 1
Proof of Theorem 1. We start from a simple case, h = 1, i.e., a unit kernel size, and we look at a single
feature corresponding to one filter, i.e. cˆj = maxni=1 cij .
To further incorporate the transformation to the input, we rewrite cˆj as a function of the transformation
index l.
cˆj(l) ≡ nmax
i=1
φ(w>j V (x
(li)
i ) + bj) =
n
max
i=1
v
(li)
ij ,
where wj is the j-th filter and we denote v
(k)
ij = φ(w
>
j V (x
(k)
i ) + bj) for simplicity.
Let S, T denote two sets that satisfy S ⊂ T ⊂ [n]. For any two vectors lS and lT satisfy that lSi = lTi ,∀i ∈ S,
and supp(lS) = S, supp(lT ) = T . With the assumption that w>j V (xi) ≤ w>j V (x(t)i ), and since the activation
function is non-decreasing, we have v(0)ij ≤ v(t)ij ,∀i ∈ [n], j ∈ [m], t ∈ [k − 1], and hereby cˆj(lS) ≤ cˆj(lT ).
Therefore for any new element’s position s and its replacement index t, we have
cˆj(l
S + tes)− cˆj(lS) = max{v(t)sj − cˆj(lS), 0}
≥max{v(t)sj − cˆj(lT ), 0} (since cˆj(lS) ≤ cˆj(lT ))
=cˆj(l
T + tes)− cˆj(lT ).
Since the final output probability is a positive weighted summation of each cˆj , it also satisfies
CWCNN(lS + tes)− CWCNN(lS) ≥ CWCNN(lT + tes)− CWCNN(lT )
Taking the max over all lS , lT we have:
f(S + {s}) = k−1max
t=1
max
supp(lS)=S
CWCNN(lS + tes)
Therefore
f(S + {s})− f(S)
=
k−1
max
t=1
{
max
supp(lS)=S
{
CWCNN(lS + tes)− CWCNN(lS)
}}
≥ k−1max
t=1
{
max
supp(lT )=T
{
CWCNN(lT + tes)− CWCNN(lT )
}}
(from (6))
=f(T + {s})− f(T ).
The case when 2 ≤ h ≤ s is essentially the same with h = 1 since each window has no overlapping. We could
simply replace v1 by v1:h and conduct the same analysis.
18
A.5 Proof of Theorem 2
Proof of Theorem 2. Recall that the hidden state node hi is defined recursively as:
h0 = C, (C is constant)
hi = φ(whi−1 +m>V (xi−1) + b).
And the classifier output is CRNN(V (x)) = yhT .
For simplicity, we denote v(j)i ≡ m>V (x(j)i ) + b. Since we will only look for the transformation that
maximizes the classifier output, without loss of generality, we assume v(j)i ≥ v(0)i ,∀i ∈ [T ], j ∈ [k − 1].
For a fixed input x = [x1, x2, · · · , xT ] and transformation index l, we want to study how changing an
intermediate hidden state affects the consecutive layers’ output. Therefore we represent the value of a j-th
hidden state as a function of the i-th hidden node and the transformation label l, that captures the network
from i-th through j-th time steps, i.e.,
fi:j(hi, l) = φ
(
w · · ·φ(whi + v(li)i ) + · · ·+ v(lj−1)j−1
)
.
Finally we want to study the whole network’s output yf0:T (C, l). We first prove the following lemma:
Lemma 1.
fi:j(hi + δ, l)− fi:j(hi, l) ≥ fi:j(hi + δ, l+ tes)− fi:j(hi, l+ tes), (6)
for any 0 ≤ i < j ≤ T, t ∈ [k − 1], s ∈ [T ], s /∈ supp(l), δ > 0.
Proof of Lemma 1.
fi:j(hi + δ, l+ tes)
= fs+1:j(φ(wfi:s(hi + δ, l+ tes) + v
(t)
s ), l+ tes)
= fs+1:j(φ(wfi:s(hi + δ, l) + v
(t)
s ), l)
Now we simplify the equation by define a(δ, t) = φ(wfi:s(hi+δ, l)+v
(t)
s ), δ ∈ R, t ∈ [k−1]. Therefore we could
rewrite the four terms in Eqn. (6) as: fs+1:j(a(δ, 0), l), fs+1:j(a(0, 0), l), fs+1:j(a(δ, t), l), and fs+1:j(a(0, t), l).
Since φ is concave and v(t)s ≥ v(0)s , notice
a(δ, t)− a(0, t) ≤ a(δ, 0)− a(0, 0). (7)
Now since fs+1:j(·, l) is a composite of concave function and is also concave, we have:
fi:j(hi + δ, l+ tes)− fi:s(hi, l+ tes)
=fs+1:j(a(δ, t), l)− fs+1:j(a(0, t), l)
≤fs+1:j(a(δ, 0) + a(0, t)− a(0, 0), l)− fs+1:j(a(0, t), l)
(from (7) and non-decreasing fs+1:j(·, l))
=fs+1:j(a(δ, 0) + (a(0, t)− a(0, 0)), l)− fs+1:j(a(0, 0) + (a(0, t)− a(0, 0)), l)
≤fs+1:j(a(δ, 0), l)− fs+1:j(a(0, 0), l) (from concavity of fs+1:j(·, l))
=fi:j(hi + δ, l)− fi:s(hi, l) (8)
Lemma 1 could be extended to a more general form. Suppose two indices lS and lU satisfy supp(lS) =
S, supp(lU ) = U, S ⊂ U , and lSi = lUi ,∀i ∈ S. Since we could write lU as lS +
∑
i∈U\S l
U
i ei, by repeatedly
using Lemma 1 we have:
fi:j(hi + δ, l
S)− fi:j(hi, lS) ≥ fi:j(hi + δ, lU )− fi:j(hi, lU ).
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This conclusion basically claims an increase into an intermediate layer of the network will have smaller effect
to the output when the network is attacked on more time steps. Then back to Theorem 2. Now consider we
add a coordinate s to the set S and U , s /∈ supp(S) ∪ supp(U).
f0:T (C, l
S + tes)− f0:T (C, lS)
=fs:T (φ(wf0:s−1(C, lS) + v(t)s ), l
S)− fs:T (φ(wf0:s−1(C, lS) + v(0)s ), lS)
≥fs:T (φ(wf0:s−1(C, lS) + v(t)s ), lU )− fs:T (φ(wf0:s−1(C, lS) + v(0)s ), lU )
(from (9) and since φ is non-decreasing, v(t)s ≥ v(0)s )
≥fs:T (φ(wf0:s−1(C, lU ) + v(t)s ), lU )− fs:T (φ(wf0:s−1(C, lU ) + v(0)s ), lU )
(since fs:T (·, lU ) is concave and similar analysis as (8))
=f0:T (C, l
U + tes)− f0:T (C, lU ) (9)
Finally, since
max
supp(l)⊂S∪{s}
CRNN(V (Tl(x))) = max
supp(lS)⊂S
max
t∈[k−1]
yf0:T (C, l
S + tes),
we have:
max
supp(l)⊂S∪{s}
CRNN(V (Tl(x)))− max
supp(l)⊂S
CRNN(V (Tl(x)))
= max
supp(lS)⊂S
( max
t∈[k−1]
yf0:T (C, l
S + tes)− yf0:T (C, lS))
≥ max
supp(lU )⊂U
( max
t∈[k−1]
yf0:T (C, l
U + tes)− yf0:T (C, lU )) (since (9) holds for any t)
= max
supp(l)⊂U∪{s}
CRNN(V (Tl(x)))
− max
supp(l)⊂U
CRNN(V (Tl(x)))
B Data statistics
Dataset Task #Train #Test
Trec07p Spam filtering 67.9k 7.5k
Yelp Sentiment analysis 560k 38k
News Fake news detection 5.3k 1.0k
Table 6: Statistics of each datasets
C Comparisons with other methods with concrete examples
In this section, we provide some concrete examples to compare our method with the other related methods.
The following six examples respectively show the combinations of three datasets (fake news, Trec07p, and
yelp) as well as the two models we use (LSTM and WCNN).
We use red font to denote changes from sentence level paraphrasing and blue for word paraphrasing.
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C.1 Empirical example 1: Task - Fake news detection. Classifier-CNN.
Method: Ours. Origin: 100% Real. ADV: 71% Fake
6 Six detainees detained in raids in Belgium Brussels, Belgium (CNN) Police detained six people in raids
raid Thursday night as when investigators raced were sent to uncover the network behind this week’s terror
attacks in the Belgian capital. The Belgian federal prosecutor’s office didn’t provide details about who had
been detained in the Brussels raids, why they had been apprehended or whether they will face charges. It
will be decided tomorrow if these people will remain in custody, the office said in a statement released late
Thursday. Two people were taken into custody in Brussels’ Jette neighborhood, one person was detained in
a different part of the capital, and three people were in a vehicle in front of the federal prosecutor’s office
when authorities apprehended them, public broadcaster RTBF reported. So far, authorities have Authorities
said they believe five men played a part people took a shot in Tuesday’s bombings in Belgium that killed 31
people and injured wounded 330. Three of the attackers are dead. Two of them could still be on the loose.
Investigators are combing over evidence from surveillance footage and the explosives stash they seized from
an apparent hideaway in a suburb. Sweeps where investigators detain people first and ask questions later are
likely to become an increasingly common tactic, CNN national security analyst Juliette Kayyem said. There
will be lots more of them, she said. They are going to be what’s called overbroad. They are going to just
try to find people or evidence that may stop the next terrorism attack, and they will figure out who they
have under custody. Khalid El Bakraoui, one of the terrorists who bombed a train near the Maelbeek metro
station, is dead. Authorities believe a second unidentified person was also involved in that attack, a senior
Belgian security source told CNN. But investigators don’t know where that the suspect is – or whether he’s he
was dead or alive. Surveillance footage shows the man holding a large bag at the station, according to Belgian
public broadcaster RTBF. It’s not clear if he was among the at least 20 killed in that blast, RTBF said.
Authorities have released a grainy image of another suspect who they believe is on the run. That man, they
say, shown in photographs wearing a black hat, was one of three attackers at Brussels Airport. Authorities
say he planted a bomb at the airport and left. The other two men in the photographs are believed to be the
suicide bombers. Fair to ask whether ’we missed the chance’ Did Belgian authorities miss a chance to stop at
least one of the suspects involved in the attacks? Bakraoui had been sentenced to nine years in prison in
Belgium back in 2010 for opening fire on police officers with a Kalashnikov during a robbery, according to
broadcaster RTBF and CNN affiliate RTL. Needless to say, he didn’t serve all that time. Given the facts, it is
justified that ... people ask how it is possible that someone was released early and we missed the chance when
he was in Turkey to detain him, said Jambon, whose offer to resign was rebuffed by Prime Minister Charles
Michel. Investigators suspect Abdeslam planned to be part of an attack by the same ISIS cell that lashed
out Tuesday, a senior Belgian counterterrorism official told CNN’s Paul Cruickshank. Authorities looked
Wednesday at the Brussels homes of the Bakraoui brothers. Those These two searches findings were not
conclusive decisive, the federal prosecutor’s office prosecutors said. Homes were searched Thursday in several
areas in and around the city, officials said. One operation in the neighborhood of Schaerbeek stretched for
hours into Friday morning. Investigators sealed off streets for several blocks. It was not immediately clear
why such a large area had been cordoned. Masked teams in hazmat gear could be seen exiting a building and
heading toward a police van. As investigations continue, a larger question looms: What could happen next?
Not long ago, Western authorities believed ISIS was focused on taking territory in Syria and Iraq, not lashing
out elsewhere. But U.S. officials now think the extremist group has been sending trained militants to Europe
for some time. These men don’t necessarily follow orders directly from ISIS headquarters. But they build
on what they’ve learned, as well as a shared philosophy and approach, to develop their own terror cells and
hatch their own plots. How many more ISIS militants are in Europe, poised to attack? That’s not clear. For
now, though, the top priority is tracking down the two men linked directly to Tuesday’s terror.
Method: Greedy[19]. Origin: 100% Real. ADV: 79% Fake
6 7 detained detention in raids in Belgium Brussels, Belgium (CNN) Police cops detained deported six people
in raids Thursday night as investigators investigation raced to uncover the network behind this week’s terror
terrorists attacks in the Belgian capital. The Belgian federal prosecutor’s office didn’t provide details about
who had been detained in the Brussels raids, why they had been apprehended or whether they we will
should face eyes charges. It will be decided tomorrow if these people will remain in custody, the office said
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told in a statement stating released late Thursday. Two people were taken into custody in Brussels’ Jette
neighborhood, one person was detained detention in a different part of the capital, and three people were in
a vehicle in front of the federal prosecutor’s office when authorities apprehended them, public broadcaster
RTBF reported. So far, authorities have said they believe five men played a part in Tuesday’s bombings in
Belgium what killed wounded 31 26 people individuals and injured 330. Three of the attackers are dead. Two
of them could still be on of loose. Investigators Investigating are they combing over evidence from surveillance
footage filmed and the explosives stash they never seized from an apparent obvious hideaway in a suburb.
Sweeps where investigators detain people first and ask questions later are likely to become an increasingly
common commonly tactic, CNN national Security analyst analysts Juliette Kayyem said say. There will
be lots more of them, she knew said say. They are going to be what’s called overbroad. They are going to
just try to find people or and/or evidence findings that may stop the of next before Terrorism attack, and
they will figure out who they have under custody. Khalid El Bakraoui, one of the terrorists who bombed a
train near the Maelbeek metro station, is dead. Authorities believe a second unidentified person was also
involved in that attack, a senior Belgian Security source sources told saying CNN. But investigation don’t
know where that suspect victim is be – or any whether not he’s dead dying or and/or alive. Surveillance
footage shows the man holding a large bag at the station, according to Belgian public broadcaster RTBF. It’s
not clear if he was among the at least 20 26 killed kill in that blast, RTBF said say. Authorities have released
a another grainy image of the another suspect who they believe is on the run. That man, they say, shown in
photographs photo wearing wear a one black red hat, was one of three twelve attackers attacker at Brussels
Airport. Authorities say he planted a bomb at the airport and left. The other two men in the photographs
are believed supposedly to be the suicide suicidal bombers. Fair to ask whether ’we missed the chance’ Did
Belgian authorities miss a chance to stop at least one of the suspects involved in the attacks? Bakraoui had
been sentenced to nine years in prison in Belgium back in 2010 for opening fire on police policemen officers
deputies with a Kalashnikov during a robbery, according to broadcaster RTBF and CNN affiliates RTL.
Needless to say, he didn’t serve all that time. Given the facts, it is justified that actually ... people everyone
ask tell how it is possible that what someone was released early and we you missed of chance when he was in
Turkey to detain him, said told Jambon, whose offer to resign was rebuffed by Prime Minister Charles Michel.
Investigators Investigation suspected Abdeslam planned planning to be part of an attack enemy by the same
different ISIS cells that lashed out Tuesday, a senior junior Belgian counter-terrorism unofficial told CNN’s
Paul Cruickshank. Authorities looked Wednesday at the Brussels homes of the Bakraoui brothers. Those
Them two one searches were not conclusive, the federal prosecutor’s Office said say. Homes Houses were
searched Thursday in several areas in and around the city, officials authorities said say. One operation in
the neighborhood of Schaerbeek stretched for hours into Friday morning. Investigators sealed off streets for
several blocks. It was not immediately clear why such a large area had been cordoned. Masked teams in
hazmat gear could be seen exiting a building and heading toward a police van. As investigations continue,
a larger question looms: What could happen next? Not long ago, Western authorities believed ISIS was
focused on taking territory in Syria and Iraq, not lashing out elsewhere. But U.S. officials now think the
extremist group has been sending trained militants to Europe for some time. These men don’t necessarily
follow orders directly from ISIS headquarters. But they build on what they’ve learned, as well as a shared
philosophy and approach, to develop their own terror cells and hatch their own plots. How many more ISIS
militants are in Europe, poised to attack? That’s not clear. For now, though, the top priority is tracking
down the two men linked directly to Tuesday’s terror.
Method: Gradient method[18]. Origin: 100% Real. ADV: 99.5% Real
6 detained in raids in Belgium Brussels, Belgium (CNN) Police detained six people in raids Thursday
night as well investigators raced rode to uncover the of network networks behind this it week’s terror attacks
in the of Belgian capital. The Belgian federal prosecutor’s office didn’t provide details about who had been
detained arrested in the of Brussels raids, why they have had been being apprehended or whether they will
be face charges. It will should decided tomorrow if these people will be remain remains in custody, the office
offices said in a statement released late Thursday. Two Three people were taken into custody in Brussels’
Jette neighborhood, one another person was detained in a different part of the the capital, and three people
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were had in a vehicle in front of the of federal prosecutor’s office when authorities officials apprehended
them, public broadcaster RTBF reported. So far, authorities have said they believe five men played playing
a another part in Tuesday’s bombings in Belgium that killed 31 29 people and injured 330. Three of the
attacker be dead. Two of them could still be on the loose. Investigators are combing over evidence from
surveillance footage filmed and the explosives stash they seized from an apparent hideaway in a another
suburb. Sweeps where investigator detain people first second and ask questions later are likely to become an
increasingly commonly tactic, CNN national security analyst Juliette Kayyem said. There will be lot more of
them, she said guess. They are going to able be should what’s called known overbroad. They are going to
able just trying to find people or evidence that may stop the next Terrorism attack, and they will figures out
up whom they have under custody. Khalid El Bakraoui, one of the terrorists who bombed a train near the
Maelbeek metro station, is dead. Authorities Officials believe a second unidentified person was also involved
in that attack, a senior Belgian Security sources told talked CNN. Blut Though investigators don’t know think
where there that because suspect is – or whether if he’s dead dying or either alive. Surveillance footage shows
the man holding a large bag at the station, according to Belgian public broadcaster RTBF. It’s not clear if he
was among the of at least 20 25 killed in that because blast, RTBF said guess. Authorities have ’ve released
another grainy image of another one suspect who they have believe is on the run. That man, they say, shown
in photographs wearing a black grey hat, was one another of three attackers at Brussels Airport. Authorities
say he planted a bomb at the airport and left. The other two women in of photographs are believed to be the
suicidal bombers. Fair to able ask tell whether ’we missed the chance’ Did Belgian authorities miss a chance
to stopping at least one of the suspects involved in of attacks? Bakraoui had came been being sentenced
convicted to nine years in prison in Belgium Netherlands back in 2010 for opening closing fires on policemen
officers policemen with another Kalashnikov during a robbery, according to broadcaster RTBF and CNN
affiliate RTL. Needless to say, he didn’t serve all that time. Given the facts, it is justified that ... people ask
tell how what it is possible that someone was released early and we missed of chance when He was in Turkey
to detaining him, said Jambon, whose offering to resign was rebuffed by Prime Minister Charles Michel.
Investigators suspect Abdeslam planned to able be should part of the an attack by the same ISIS cell that
lashed out Tuesday, a junior Belgian counter-terrorism unofficial told CNN’s Paul Cruickshank. Authorities
looked seemed Wednesday at the Brussels homes of the Bakraoui brothers. Those two searches were not
conclusive, the federal prosecutor’s office said. Homes were searched Thursday in several numerous areas in
and around the city, officials said guess. One operation in the of neighborhood of Schaerbeek stretched for
hours into Friday morning. Investigators sealed off streets for several blocks. It was not immediately clear
why such a large areas had been being cordoned. Masked teams in hazmat gears could be seen exiting another
buildings and heading towards another police van. As investigations continue, a larger sized questions looms:
What could happen next? Not long ago, Western authorities believed ISIS was focused on taking territory
in Syria and Iraq, not lashing out elsewhere. But U.S. officials authorities now think know the extremist
group has being sending trained militants insurgents to Europe for some time. These men don’t necessarily
follow orders directly from ISIS headquarters. But they build on what they’ve learned, as well as a shared
philosophy and approach, to develop their own terror cells and hatch their own your plots. How many more
less ISIS militants are these in Europe, poised to attack? That’s not clear. For now, though, the top priority
is tracking down the two men linked directly to Tuesday’s terror.
C.2 Empirical example 2: Task - Fake news detection. Classifier - LSTM.
Method: Ours. Origin: 100% Fake. ADV: 77% Real
Man Guy punctuates high-speed chase with stop at In-N-Out Burger drive-thru Print [Ed. - Well, that’s a
new one. Okay, that ’s a new one.] A One man is in custody after leading police on a bizarre chase into the
east Valley on Wednesday night. Phoenix police began has begun following the suspect in Phoenix and the
pursuit continued into the east Valley, but it took a bizarre turn when the suspect stopped at an In-N-Out
Burger restaurant’s drive-thru drive-through near Priest and Ray Roads in Chandler. The suspect appeared
to order food, but then drove away and got out of his pickup truck near Rock Wren Way and Ray Road. He
then ran into a backyard ran to the backyard and tried to get into a house through the back door get in the
home.
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Mehod: greedy. Origin: 100% Fake. ADV: 86% Fake.
Man Guy punctuates high-speed chase with stopping at In-N-Out Burger drive-thru Print [Ed. - Well, that’s
a new one.] Another man is which in custody after earlier leading police officers on a bizarre chase into out
the east north Valley on Wednesday night. Phoenix police arrested began begun following the of suspects in
Phoenix and the pursuit pursuing continued into the eastern Valley, but though it took a bizarre turning
when the of suspects stopped stopping at an In-N-Out Burger restaurant’s drive-thru nearby Priest and Ray
Roads in Chandler. The suspect appeared to order food, but then drove away and got out of his pickup truck
near Rock Wren Way and Ray Road. He then ran into a backyard and tried to get into a house through the
back door.
Method: gradient method[18]. Origin: 100% Fake. ADV: 1− 2.5e−3 Fake.
Man punctuates high-speed chase with stopping at In-N-Out Burgers drive-thru Print [Ed. - Well, that’s a
new one.] A man is in custody after leading police arrest on a bizarre chase into the east Valley on Wednesday
night. Phoenix police began following the suspect in Phoenix and the pursuit continued into the of east west
Valley, but it took a bizarre turn then when that the of suspect stopped at an In-N-Out Burger restaurant’s
drive-thru nearby Priest and Ray Roads in Chandler. The suspect appeared to ordering food, but then drove
away and got out of his pickup pick-up truck near Rocks Wren Chickadee Ways and Ray Road. He then ran
into a backyard and tried to get into a house through the back again door.
C.3 Empirical example 3: Task - Spam filtering. Classifier - WCNN.
Method: Ours. Origin: 100% Spam. ADV: 77% Ham
Become Fit For Life! HGH is a very complex molecule produced by the anterior lobe of the pituitary
gland, which is located at the base of the brain. While it stimulates growth in children, it is important for
maintaining a healthy body healthy bodies composition and well-being in adults. It is the primary hormone
estrogen that controls many several of the body’s organs and it stimulates tissue repair, brains functions,
cell replacement, and enzyme function. Determining the levels of IGF-1 (Insulin Growth Factor) is how we
measure HGH in the body. Receive a younger future potential with HGH
Method: Greedy[19]. Origin: 100% Spam. ADV: 71% Ham
Become Fit For Life! HGH is a very fairly complex molecule produced by the anterior lobe of the the
of pituitary gland, which is has located at the base of the brain. While it that stimulates growth growing
in children, it what is important significant for maintaining another healthy body bodies composition and
well-being in adults. It is the primary secondary hormone progesterone that could controls many several
of the body’s organs and it that stimulates tissue repair, brains functions, cell replacement, and enzyme
function. Determining Determine the levels of IGF-1 (Insulin Growth Factor) is which how understand we
measure HGH in the of body. Receive a younger future with HGH
Method: Gradient method[18]. Origin: 100% Spam. ADV: 1− 2.7e−5 spam
Become Fit For Life! HGH is a very complex molecule produced by the anterior lobe of the pituitary
gland, which that is located situated at the base of the brain. While it stimulates growth in children, it but is
has important for maintaining a healthy body bodies compositions and well-being in adults. It is the primary
secondary hormones that controls many of the body’s organs and it but stimulates tissues repair, brains
functions, cell replacement, and enzyme function. Determining the levels of IGF-1 (Insulin Growthing Factor)
is how we measure HGH in the of body. Receive a younger future with HGH
C.4 Empirical Example 4: Task - Spam filtering. Classifier - LSTM.
Method: Ours. Origin: 100% Ham. ADV: 87% Spam
I’ve always run jigdo-lite against my own mirror. It provides offers two couple things:
1) Proves I can you are able to build the ISOs from what I have mirrored locally.
2) Doesn’t waste additional bandwidth. As long as the checksums match what is provided from the official
ISO image masters site, I don’t see what the difference would be. Anyone else do this? :) ^_^
Will Simon Paillard wrote:
> On Mon, Apr 09, 2007 at 08:43:07AM -0400, Jean-Francois Chevrette wrote:
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> > Hi,
> >
> > does anyone have another straightforward guide on how to use jigdo to build and mirror ISOs? I’ve been
reading both jigdo documentation and debian’s webpage web-site on the subjet and it just won’t work.
>
> Maybe with this one :
http://www.debian.org/CD/mirroring/#jigdomirror
> and the related links ?
>
> Best regards,
Method: Greedy[19]. Origin: 100% Ham. ADV: 90% Spam
I’ve always run jigdo-lite against my myself own mirror. It provides offers two five things:
1) Proves I u can reliably build the ISOs from what something I im have ’ve mirrored locally.
2) Doesn’t waste additional extra bandwidth. As long as the checksums matches what is provided from the
unofficial ISO image master site, I thats don’t see ’ll what the difference would be. Anyone Somebody else do
this you? :) !!
Will Must Simon Paillard wrote:
> On Mon, Apr 09, 2007 at 08:43:07AM -0400, Jean-Francois Chevrette wrote:
> > Hi,
> >
> > does anyone have another straightforward guide on how to able use jigdo to build and mirror ISOs? I’ve
been reading writing both other jigdo documentation and debian’s webpage on the subjet and it just won’t
work.
>
> Maybe with this one :
http://www.debian.org/CD/mirroring/#jigdomirror
> and the related links ?
>
> Best regards,
Method: Gradient method[18]. Origin: 100% Ham. ADV: 1− 2.2e−15 Ham
I’ve always run jigdo-lite against my myself own mirror. It What provides two things:
1) Proves I you can reliably building the ISOs from what I have mirrored locally.
2) Doesn’t waste additional bandwidth. As long as the checksums match what is provided from the unofficial
ISO image master site, I u don’t see what the difference would could be. Anyone else do this? :) :-)
Will Simon Paillard wrote:
> On Mon, Apr 09, 2007 at 08:43:07AM -0400, Jean-Francois Chevrette wrote:
> > Hi,
> >
> > does anyone have a straightforward guide on how what to able use jigdo to build and mirror ISOs? I’ve
been reading both jigdo documentation and debian’s webpage web-site on the subjet and it just won’t work.
> > Maybe with this one :
http://www.debian.org/CD/mirroring/#jigdomirror
> and the related links ?
>
> Best regards,
C.5 Empirical Example 5: Task - Sentiment analysis. Classifier - CNN.
Method: Ours. Origin: 100% Positive. ADV: 93% Negative
This Starbucks location is located in the Bally’s Grand Bazaar Shops. It’s open 24/7 and it is huge. There is
plenty of seating. Most of the seating is stadium type seating with benches. They also have an out door
patio. The staff is very friendly and attentive to the guests. I do notice that they are under staffed sometimes
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when they are busy. They ’ll get your drinks out pretty fast though. Also, this location place is not owned by
the casino property so they don’t do n’t charge outrageous prices like the location as a place on the an Linq
promenade does. Definitely one of my favorite Starbucks stores. Stop by if your on the Strip.
Method: Greedy[19]. Origin: 100% Positive. ADV: 74% Negative
This Starbucks location is be located in the Bally’s Grand Bazaar Shops. It’s open 24/7 and it nothing is be
huge. There Nothing is plenty of the seating. Most Extremely of the of seating is has stadium types seating
seats with benches. They Have also will have never an out door patio. The staff is very friendly and attentive
to the guests. I do notice that they are under staffed sometimes when they are busy. They get your drinks
out pretty fast though. Also, this location is not owned by the casino so they don’t charge outrageous prices
like the location on the Linq promenade does. Definitely one of my favorite Starbucks stores. Stop by if your
on the Strip.
Method: Gradient method[18]. Origin: 100% Positive. ADV: 1− 6.9e−12 Positive This It Starbucks
Mcdonalds location is located in the Bally’s Grand Bazaar Shops. It’s open 24/7 and it is huge. There is
plenty of seating. Most Many of the the seating is stadium type seating with benches. They also have ’ve an
out up door patio. The staff is very friendly and attentive to the guests. I do notice that they are under
staffed sometimes when they are busy. They getting your drinks out pretty fast though. Also, this location is
not owned by the of casino so too they don’t charge outrageous prices like think the location on the of Linq
promenade seafront does. Definitely one of my favorite Starbucks stores. Stop by if unless your on the Strip.
C.6 Empirical Example 6: Task - Sentiment analysis. Classifier - LSTM.
Method: Ours. Origin: 100% Positive. ADV: 93% Negative
I suppose I should write a review here since my little Noodle-oo is currently serving as their spokes dog in
the photos. We both love Scooby Do’s. They treat my little butt-faced dog like a prince and are receptive to
correcting anything about the cut that I perceive as being weird. Like that funny poofy pompadour. Mohawk
it out, yo. Done. In like five seconds my little man was looking fabulous and bad ass. Not something easily
accomplished with a prancing pup that literally chases butterflies through tall grasses. (He ended up looking
like a little lamb as the cut grew out too. So adorable.) The shampoo they use here is also amazing. Noodles
usually smells like tacos (a combination of beef stank and corn chips) but after getting back from the Do’s, he
smelled like Christmas morning! Sugar and spice and everything nice instead of frogs and snails and puppy
dog tails. He’s got some gender identity issues to deal with. The pricing is also cheaper than some of the big
name conglomerates out there The price is cheaper than some of the big names below. I’m talking to you
Petsmart! I’ve taken my other pup to Smelly Dog before, but unless I need dog sitting play time after the
cut, I’ll go with Scooby’s. They genuinely seem to like my little Noodle monster.
Method: Greedy[19]. Origin: 100% Positive. ADV: 88% Negative
I suppose I should write a review here since my little Noodle-oo is currently serving as their spokes dog in
the photos. We both love Scooby Do’s. They treat my little butt-faced dog like a prince and are receptive to
correcting anything about the cut that I perceive as being weird. Like that funny humorous poofy pompadour.
Mohawk it out, yo. Done. In like five seconds my little woman was looking fabulous and bad ass. Not
something easily accomplished with a prancing pup that literally chases butterflies through tall grasses. (He
ended up looking like a little lamb as the cut grew out too. So adorable.) The shampoo they use here is also
amazing. Noodles usually smells like tacos (a combination of between beef stank and corn chips) but after
getting back from the Do’s, he smelled like Christmas morning! Sugar and spice and everything nice instead
of frogs and snails and puppy dog tails. He’s got some gender identity issues to deal with. The pricing is also
cheaper than some of the big name conglomerates out there. I’m talking to you Petsmart! I’ve taken my
other pup to Smelly Dog before, but unless I need dog sitting play time after the cut, I’ll go with Scooby’s.
They genuinely seem to like my little Noodle monster.
Method: Gradient method[18]. Origin: 100% Positive. ADV: 93% Negative
I suppose I should write Write a review here since my little Noodle-oo is currently serving as their spokes
dog in the photos. We both love Scooby Do’s. They treat cure my little butt-faced dog like another prince
knight and but are receptive to correcting anything about the cut that I perceive as that being weird. Like
that funny poofy pompadour. Mohawk it out, yo. Done. In like five eleven seconds secs my little man was
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looking fabulous and bad ass. Not something easily readily accomplished with a prancing strutting pup that
literally chases butterflies through tall grasses. (He ended up looking like a little lamb beef as the The cut
grew out too. So adorable.) The shampoo they use here is also amazing. Noodles usually smells like tacos
quesadillas (a combination of beef stank and corn chips) but after getting back from the Do’s, he smelled like
Christmas morning! Sugar and spice cumin and everything nice instead of frogs and snails and puppy dog
tails. He’s got some those gender sexuality identity issues difficulties to deal contract with. The pricing is
also cheaper than some of the big huge name conglomerates out there. I’m talking to you Petsmart! I’ve
taken brought my other pup to Smelly Dog before, but unless I need dog sitting play time after the cut, I’ll
go with Scooby’s. They genuinely nonetheless seem to like my little Noodle monster.
27
